Recent empirical research has focused on the role of institutions in overall economic performance. This paper examines the impact of institutions on the relative performance of the service sector. Through cross-country level and growth regressions we establish the following stylized fact: countries with better institutions have relatively larger and more dynamic service sectors. We suggest that regulatory and contract enforcing institutions play a key role in the development of service sectors because these sectors enter into a more complex web of transactions with the rest of the economy and are more prone to market failure due to asymmetric information. JEL: D23, L80, O11, O14
Introduction
The service sector accounts for an overwhelming and growing proportion of economic activity in all parts of the world today. The share of the service sector, as measured by the value added in the sector as a proportion of GDP, stood on average at 54% in 2000 in a sample of over 150 countries. The corresponding figure a decade earlier was just under 50%. 1 At the same time there is considerable variation in the size of the sector ranging from 5.6% in Equatorial Guinea to 86% in Hong Kong.
Why is it that some countries transformed into service-based economies while others did not? Existing work on this question has largely focused on the demand side. It is argued that services have an income elasticity of demand greater than 1 so that as real income per capita increases, real services per capita grow more than the proportional growth in income (Inman, 1985, p. 2; Fuchs, 1968) . The present paper suggests another reason, i.e. the role of institutions. We duly control for GDP per capita, endowments, infrastructure, geography and use the instrumental variable method to address endogeneity related concerns. Our main finding is that better institutions have a significant and positive effect on the size of the service sector relative to GDP. In other words, institutions are more important for the service sector than for the rest of the economy. This holds for the level as well as the growth of services share in GDP.
That institutions matter for the level of GDP per capita is at some level obvious (Acemoglu et al. 2001 ). The argument can be extended to per capita value added in the service sector given that the sector is the most significant contributor to GDP in a majority of countries. What is not obvious is whether institutions matter more for the service sector than for the rest of the economy and addressing this issue is the primary concern of the present paper.
There is a large body of empirical work on the impact of institutions on the overall performance (GDP per capita) of the economy but relatively little on the how the impact varies across sectors. Levchencko (2004) and Nunn (2005) find that better institutions shift a country's comparative advantage towards goods which depend more on institutions. These papers draw a clear link between institutions and the structure (pattern of specialization) of the economy. Rajan and Zingales (1998) study whether industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external finance develop faster in countries with more-developed financial institutions (markets). These papers do shed some light on the impact of institutions across sectors in the relative sense. However, unlike the present work, none of them considers the role of broad governance institutions on the performance of the service sector.
Institutional development is particularly important for the service sector because of both supply-and demand-side attributes. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) argue that a sector is institutionally more dependent the more evenly spread are its intermediate input purchases across other sectors. 2 The basic insight here is that institutions lower the transaction cost and hence benefit those sectors more which enter into a more complex web of transactions with the rest of the economy. The measure suggested by Blanchard and Kremer is acknowledged by the authors to be a "noisy" one and has a number of limitations. First, the measure does not include intra-sector transactions between firms largely due to data limitations. Second, it does not take into account inputs supplied by a sector although there is no reason to believe that high transaction costs do not affect the suppliers as well.
Nevertheless, an examination of the input-output matrices for a number of countries reveals that in general input supplies and purchases were much more evenly distributed for the services sectors relative to manufacturing. In the spirit of Blanchard and Kremer, it can be argued that the services sectors are more institutionally dependent than the other sectors. As an example, institutional dependence of various sectors calculated using India's input-output matrix is shown in Figure 1 where higher values indicate greater dependence.
3 2 Blanchard and Kremer (1997) look at the decline in output of manufacturing sectors in the former Soviet Union countries between 1992 and 1994 and argue that the decline was more pronounced in the more institutionally dependent sectors. 3 The graph uses GTAP data for India. To construct the graph we first computed the Gini coefficient for the inputs supplied to and bought from a sector to all other sectors. We then calculated 100 minus Gini for each sector to arrive at the figures shown in the graph. This is slightly different from the approach of Blanchard and Kremer who use the inverse of the Herfindahl index instead. Both these measures are widely used in the literature. The second reason for the relatively greater institutional dependence of services is the greater incidence of market failures due to asymmetric information. For example, Holmstrom (1985, p. 183 ) singles out the difficulty in assessing the quality of the service by one party (typically, the buyer) as the critical distinguishing attribute of services. He concludes that "Characteristics like these suggest that the determinants of supply and demand in the service sector will be somewhat different from those in the goods sector and also that institutions facilitating economic exchange and production of services will exhibit idiosyncratic features." (p. 183, italics added) While Holmstrom focuses on "reputation building" as the key solution or institution, our focus is on institutions concerned with regulation and contract enforcement. Theory too suggests that the use of explicit contracts such as contingent fee schedules or warranties is an important remedy for information related market failures. However, to enforce such contracts in an efficient, cheap and impartial way requires the existence of appropriate institutions. 4 Our argument is not affected by the usual concern that measured differences in the size of the services sector could simply reflect "splintering" without any real change in the value of services output. Splintering occurs when industrial firms make greater use of specialist sub-contractors to provide services that were previously provided by the firms themselves (Bhagwati, 1984) . Since splintering creates a more complex economy and is likely to exacerbate the problem of asymmetric information, splintering itself is likely to be a consequences of institutional development. The recent growth of the service sector in many parts of the world is, however, unlikely to be primarily due to splintering.
Institutional dependence of sectors
For example, Gordon and Gupta (2004) find that splintering played a fairly limited role in the services boom in India in the 1990s, contributing only about 0.25 percentage points to the 3.1 % annual growth rate of the services value added.
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Consider also how institutions are defined and measured in the literature. North (1990, p. 3) sates that institutions are "the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." In a detailed study, Kaufmann et al. (2003) measure the quality of institutions across countries by looking at a large number of factors which in the sense of North capture "rules of the game". We use their Rule of Law index (for 2002) as a measure of institutional 4 A related point here is that dissemination of information is crucial in mitigating informational asymmetries. Better institutions in the sense describe above are likely to have better channels for sharing and dissemination of information. 5 Another concern is that better institutions may lead to a transfer of activity from the informal to the formal sector thereby affecting the measured services to GDP ratio. It is difficult to control for this effect because there is no reliable data available on the size of the informal services sector. This problem is not specific to our paper but applies more broadly to the literature on the impact of institutions on GDP, trade and subsectors.
development across countries. The index varies between -1.86 (Congo, DR) and 2.05 (Luxembourg) and its main focus is on assessing the degree to which contracts (public and private) are enforced and the ease and impartiality of the enforcement process. The findings in Blanchard and Kremer and the problem of asymmetric information discussed above suggest that the Rule of Law measure is the most appropriate measure of institutions in the context of the present paper.
The key difficulty in estimating the impact of institutions on the service sector is the problem of endogeneity. For example, Rule of Law is likely to be positively correlated with GDP per capita and the stock of the highly educated in a country. Thus, it becomes difficult to isolate the effect of institutions on the service sector. One way to resolve the problem is to generate exogenous variations in the Rule of Law variable. We draw on the literature concerning the political determinants of institutions to this end.
Political determinants are deeply rooted in historical factors and are exogenous to the current economic structure of a country. We use two such historical factors, a country's legal origin and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, as instruments for Rule of Law.
The plan of the remaining sections is as follows. In section 1 we discuss our data sources and provide summary measures of the variables used. This is followed by an outline of the empirical methodology and OLS level regressions. The endogeneity problem is addressed in Section 2 using the two stage instrumental variable method. In section 3 we focus on growth regressions. Our main findings and suggestions for future work are stated in the conclusion of the paper.
Section 1
OLS regression results in this section are based on the following equation (1 OLS regression results for equation (1) are reported in Table 1 below.
Significance levels are denoted by * * * (1% or less), * * (5% or less) and * (10% or less) and this convention is followed throughout. 7 As for S i , we take average values over 1999-2001 period for GDP, Pop, Power and Roads. For the Skill measure we experimented with data for 2000 also but the results were almost unchanged. 8 In regressions not reported here we also used a measure of teledensity as an additional control. The variable did not produce any noticeable change in the Law coefficient and we decided to drop it because it is highly correlated with GDP, Power and Roads. For example, the direct correlation between teledensity and GDP is 0.91 in our sample.
The table shows that Law has a strong and positive effect on the performance of the service sector which is statistically significant at well below 5% level in all the cases.
Roads has a negative while Latitude a positive effect. But neither of these effects are highly significant. Dummies for Africa and Asia (with the one for North America dropped) are negative and statistically significant at less than 10% level in some cases and at less than 5% level in the remaining cases. Other continental dummies are
insignificant. An important result in Table 1 is that the estimated coefficient of Law is We performed a number of robustness checks and found that the results in Table 1 remained largely unchanged. That is, the estimate of the Law coefficient remained roughly unchanged and significant at less than 5% level. We discuss some of these results below.
Firstly, the sample used in the regressions above includes 31 countries with Regression results for the reduced sample are reported in Table 2 , Appendix A5 and these are roughly similar to the ones above but slightly stronger in terms of the significance level of the Law coefficient.
Secondly, our sample includes some extremely small countries mainly in the Caribbean region. Most of these countries have much higher levels of services to GDP ratios and Law when compared to the rest of the world. For example, for the ten smallest countries in terms of population in 2000 10 , the services to GDP ratio stood at 67% and the value of Law at .347 which is about the 75th percentile level. To ensure that our results are not driven by the specifics of small countries we dropped all these ten countries from our sample. Regression results in the reduced sample were roughly similar to the ones in Table 3 , Appendix A5. These results suggest that the service sector is particularly sensitive to the quality of institutions in the poorer developing countries.
We now proceed to the next section where we attempt to generate exogenous variation in Law to address endogeneity related concerns with the findings reported above.
Section 2
In the previous section we found a strong correlation between Law and the size of the service sector. Although we controlled for a number of variables, we cannot interpret the correlation as causal. First, there could be a feedback effect. That is, higher S values could trigger improvements in Law. Second, the Law variable could be picking up the effects of unobservable covariates. A solution to these problems is to generate truly exogenous variations in Law. This will be our goal in this section. Political determinants present a more promising option in this context. These determinants focus on redistribution rather than efficiency and the underlying idea is that policies and institutions are shaped by those in power to stay in power and to transfer resources to themselves (Marx 1872 , North 1990 , Olson 1993 (Mauro 1995) . Such an environment is hardly conducive to institutional development. Furthermore, the adverse effect of ethnic diversity may not be restricted to the development of the legal framework but also affect the ability of the government to implement the laws in an efficient, impartial and reliable manner. 12 Data on ELF used in this paper are taken from La Porta et al. It is a summary measure of five indices which broadly measure the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country do not belong to the same ethnolinguistic 12 We note that our Law variable is a summary measure of a large number of governance indicators including the efficiency and impartiality with which they are implemented and observed.
To generate exogenous variations in
group. ELF lies between 0 and 1 with higher values implying a more fragmented country.
Data used to construct ELF belong to the early 1960s and details are provided in Appendix A2. Figure 2 shows the relationship between Law and ELF which is along expected lines. endogeneity related concern too with the German and Scandinavian system countries. Table 4 helps illustrate the point.
Law and Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization
13 13 The sample in Table 4 is smaller than the one in section 1 due to missing data on ELF and lagged values of the endogenous variables which are used in the later regressions.
Compared to the rest of the world, German and Scandinavian system countries have very high levels of Law, services share, Power, Roads, etc. ELF is also low for these countries.
In actual values, the size of the service sector in Scandinavian system countries equals 65% of GDP as compared to 54% for the rest of the world and power generation per capita in these countries is almost 8 times that in the rest of the world. These features can lead to identification problems in that our instruments can easily pick up the effects of Power, Roads, etc. The identification problem is not solved by dropping LO as an instrument because ELF is also much lower in these countries relative to the rest of the world. The same holds for the German system countries but to a lesser extent. In light of these concerns, we follow the broad literature by dropping the German and Scandinavian legal origin countries from our sample in the remainder of the paper. In regression results not reported here we did not drop these countries and found that our overidentification tests for the exogeneity of instruments failed as soon we introduced German and Scandinavian system countries in the sample. However, this problem was eliminated when we controlled for Roads and the estimated coefficient of Law was significant at less than 5% level in all these regressions.
There are many advantages of using legal origin to predict Law. Firstly, the roots of the current legal systems go far back in history and the feedback effect (reverse causality) is unlikely to be an issue with them. 14 Secondly, different legal systems offer not only different legal frameworks but also the ease with which they can be implemented and subsequently modified. This has direct bearing on our long-run measure of institutional quality. Thirdly, as Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) demonstrate, legal origin does not seem to have a significant effect on economic outcomes other than through its impact on the quality of institutions. Thus, the "exclusion" principle necessary for the validity of instruments is likely to hold for LO. Our overidentification tests support this view.
Two Stage Instrumental Variable Regression results
We use a simple structure for our base Two Stage Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions.
The estimated equation is:
(2) ... Dropping observations for which data on ELF are missing, we are left with 103 observations. IV regression results for equation 2 are reported in Table 5 below. Dropping all the LAC countries we found the estimated coefficient value to be .309 (p value of .00).
Another variable widely used in the literature to instrument the quality of institutions is the settler mortality rate. This is the mortality rate of soldiers, missionaries and sailors stationed in the colonies between the 17th and 19th centuries and is largely based on the work of historian Philip D. Curtin. The problem with this instrument is that it is not available for a number of countries in our sample. However, for the 58 countries for which data is available, we found that the results presented in Table 5 hardly changed when (logged) settler mortality was used to instrument Law. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of Law was 0.333 (significant at less than 1% level). The corresponding figure using ELF and LO as instruments is 0.304 (significant at less than 1% level).
Although the overidentification test statistics support the exogeneity of our instruments, it will be useful to check how the results change when we include the remaining variables.
We focus here on the set of all countries since the results for the subset of English and
French legal origin countries are roughly similar.
The immediate problem with including the remaining variables is that these variables (GDP, Roads, etc.) are themselves potentially endogenous which tends to bias the estimate of the Law coefficient. In fact we found that the Hansen test clearly rejected the exogeneity of all our variables other than Pop and Continent even when we used 10-15 year lagged values. The results suggest that our controls are picking up the effect of some variable(s) absorbed in the error term. On closer inspection we found that the key "missing variable" is the LAC (Latin America & Caribbean) dummy. That is, once we control for "LAC vs. the rest" the endogeneity problem completely disappears.
We define the benchmark case as the base regression for equation (2) with LAC as an additional regressor. Starting with this benchmark case we add the remaining controls individually and simultaneously. The results are summarized in Table 6 and Law. Column (1) provides the estimated coefficients of these controls, column (2) the estimated Law coefficients while column (3) reports the same for the LAC dummy.
Overidentification test statistics are reported in column (4). Important results in the table are as follows. 15 Firstly, the estimate of the Law coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all the regressions. Thus, our findings in Table 5 are robust as far as the sign and the significance level of the Law coefficient is concerned. Secondly, with all the variables included, the Law coefficient estimate is .322 (last row in the upper panel of Table 6) which is not too different from the .351 estimate in Table 5 , column (2). 16 Following
Altonji et al. (2000), the small difference between these two estimated coefficient values may be seen as indicating the absence of a significant omitted variable bias problem in the results above. 17 Thirdly, the Hansen test does not reject the exogeneity of the instruments in any of the reported regressions. Fourthly, the LAC dummy is significant in all the cases except when we include all the variables simultaneously (last row, upper panel).
We also checked for the robustness of the results in Tables 5 and 6 with respect to the small island Caribbean countries. We did this in two ways. Firstly, we dropped all the small Caribbean countries (as in Section 1) and secondly we split the LAC group into two parts: the small Caribbean countries group and the rest of LAC. These changes did not have any significant effect on our results. That is, the second stage Law coefficient and the rest of LAC dummy remained statistically significant at less than 5% level while 15 We treat the current (2000) Table 6 do not reject the validity of this instrumental approach. 16 In the last row of the upper panel of Table 6 where we include all the variables the estimated coefficient of Roads is -.082 which is significant at less than 1% level. All other variables apart from Law are insignificant at 10% level or less including the continental dummies. 17 Altonji et al. (2000) develop a formal methodology to assess the importance of omitted variable bias. The basic idea is that if the estimate of the coefficient of interest does not change as additional covariates are included in the regression, it is less likely to change if we were able to add some of the missing omitted variables. For a similar interpretation, see for example, Acemoglu (2001 Acemoglu ( , p. 1388 .
the dummy for the small Caribbean countries (when included) was statistically insignificant. 18 
Human capital
The lower panel of Table 6 shows the results when we include human capital (Skill) as an additional control. The variable is taken from Barro and Lee dataset and is the (logged) per capita stock of the tertiary educated in 1995 19 and instrumented using the 1985 values. We note that the sample size of these regressions is smaller (71 countries) due to missing data on the Skill measure. The base regression (using LAC and Law as the only explanatory variables) yields a value of .280 for the Law coefficient (significant at less than 1% level). The corresponding coefficient value with the Skill variable included was .291 (less than 1% significant). 20 In all regressions the Hansen test statistics and the Skill coefficients were insignificant at 10% or less.
Summarizing our results so far, we found that Law has a positive and statistically significant impact on the performance of the service sector relative to the rest of the economy. Overidentification and robustness tests show that it is highly unlikely that our results suffer from endogeneity related problems. The estimated coefficients are 18 As with LAC, the endogeneity problem disappeared when we controlled for rest of LAC. However, using the dummy for small Caribbean countries alone or dropping these small countries from the sample did not remove the endogeneity problem discussed above. Thus, the results reported for the LAC dummy above are primarily driven by the specifics of the larger countries in the group and not by those of the small Caribbean countries. 19 We use the 1995 value of Skill to allow for any gestation lag between schooling and entry into the labor market. However, our results are almost unchanged if we use the 2000 values as these are highly correlated. Further, we treat Skill as potentially endogenous (just like the other controls) and instrument it using its value in 1985. 20 With Skill and all the other controls in the sufficiently large to suggest that a service oriented economy is inconceivable without good institutions.
We now proceed to the next section where we analyze the growth experience of countries and its relationship with the Rule of Law.
Section 3
The ΔS i is value of S i in 2000 minus the same in 1990. We also used the average of annual change in S i over the 1990s as alternative measure of ΔS i but this did not change our results much. 21 The motivation for including S i,1990 as a regressor is to control for convergence related effects. In fact, some of our regressions did not pass the exogeneity test without controlling for S i,1990 . We check for robustness by adding other controls in (3) as discussed below.
IV regression results for equation (3) with and without additional controls are stated in Table 7 . Column (1) shows the regression results for the set of English & French legal origin countries without additional controls while column (3) shows the same with the Socialist system countries included in the sample. Both these regressions show a positive and statistically significant effect of Law on the (relative to GDP) growth performance of the service sector. There is also a strong evidence of convergence which is particularly strong when the Socialist system countries are included in the sample. The lower panel of Table 7 shows the first stage regression results and the findings here are similar to the ones in Section 2 except that the Socialist dummy is no longer significant. The Hansen test statistics are sufficiently small so that the exogeneity of the instruments cannot be rejected at 10% or less significance level.
Results in columns (2) and (4) The estimated coefficients of Law in Table 7 are smaller than the corresponding ones for the level regressions in Section 2 which is expected since level regressions capture long-run effects while the growth regressions capture the short or medium run (decadal) impact. Coupled with a strong convergence effect the results suggest significant gestation lags for the full (long-run) impact of improvement in Law on services to GDP ratio to be realized.
The estimated coefficients of Law in Table 7 remain roughly unchanged when we add the controls one by one in separate regressions. Table 8 provides the necessary details for the set of all countries and it is similar in construction to Table 6 with each row representing a separate regression. S i,1990 ) is the decadal change in Roads but this result does not survive when we add all the controls simultaneously.
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The bottom panel of Table 8 Summarizing our results in this section, we found that Law has a positive and a statistically significant impact on the growth performance of the service sector. Overall the level and growth regressions suggest that a service led development strategy is unlikely to be successful without significant improvements in the quality of institutions associated with the enforcement of contracts or what is broadly called the Rule of Law.
Conclusion
The present paper looks at the role that institutions play in the development of the service sector. Our findings show a strong and positive effect of institutions in this 23 ΔSkill is the change in Skill value over 1985-1995 period. context both in the level and the growth regressions. There are a number of ways in which future work can help improve our understanding of the role of institutions at the sectoral level and especially for the service sector.
Our focus in the study was on whether institutions matter more for the service sector or not. An equally important question relates to why this should or should not be the case. Building on the work of Blanchard and Kremer (1997) we suggested that one reason for the why of it could be that the services sectors are more dependent on institutions due to their greater integration with the rest of the economy. More work is needed to ascertain the validity of these factors. That is, are services sectors more integrated with the rest of the economy than manufacturing and agricultural sectors and if so then does this make them institutionally more dependent? There is very little in the formal or the informal literature on this issue.
The measure of institutional development used above is fairly broad despite its focus on the enforcement of contracts. For example, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) distinguish between "property rights institutions", which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and "contracting institutions", which enable private contracts between citizens. They find that the former matter more for long-run economic growth than the latter perhaps because agents can find ways to mitigate the adverse effects of weak contracting institutions but this is much more difficult in case of expropriation by the government. It will be extremely useful to test whether such a distinction applies to the service sector more than the other sectors.
One way to restate the results we found above is that countries with better institutions have a comparative advantage in the service sector. Implications for the pattern of trade (share of services trade in total trade) can then be drawn in accordance with the theory of factor proportions. A simple testable hypothesis would be that ceteris paribus countries with better institutions export more and import less services relative to other tradeables. Some work in beginning to emerge in this area but at present it is restricted to within manufacturing trade only. Given the increasing importance of services trade it will be immensely useful to extend this work to trade in services.
Appendix A1
Relationship between Rule of Law and the size of the service sector by continents Table 34 , and published by the UN. For some countries for which data was missing we used The World Bank's dataset. Data for countries common in these two datasets are almost identical. (1999) . ELF is the average value of five different indices compiled for the early 1960s and include: (i) the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group, (ii) probability of two randomly selected individuals speaking different languages, (iii) probability that two randomly selected agents do not speak the same language, (iv) percent of population not speaking the official language, (v) percent of population not speaking the most widely used language.
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10) Skill:
The stock of tertiary educated per capita. The data are taken from Barro and Lee dataset. perecentages in brackets)  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .234*** (.001)
Countries included in the regressions depending on their legal origin (Services to GDP
.223*** (.000)
.227*** (.000)
.224*** (.000)
.232*** (.000)
.248*** (.000) p values in brackets. Law_Low is the coefficient for countries with Law values below the 75 th percentile and Law_High is the corresponding coefficient for the rest of the countries.
